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REPLY BRIEF FOR APPELLANT 
I. CLOSING RESOURCES CONCEDES THE MAJORITY OF FORT 
PIERCE'S ARGUMENTS. 
Closing Resources offers no response to the vast majority of our points. It does 
not contest that it transacted business within Utah. It does not dispute that it contracted to 
supply services in Utah. Closing Resources therefore concedes that its conduct places it 
within the reach of Utah's long arm statute. Closing Resources also concedes, by its 
silence, that it knew and understood that this transaction, by its very nature, was to be 
performed in Utah, and required Closing Resources to purposefully direct its conduct to 
Utah. It does not contest or even respond to our argument that by accepting the position 
of escrow agent it assumed a fiduciary responsibility to its Utah principal, Fort Pierce. 
Thus, Closing Resources acknowledges that it was provided fair warning that its 
participation in this transaction could land it in a Utah courtroom. 
Further, Closing Resources does not contest that the Agreement at issue in this 
case constituted the escrow contract between Closing Resources and Fort Pierce, 
regardless of the fact that Closing Resources did not sign the Agreement. It offers no 
response to the argument concerning the forum selection clause in the Agreement. And, 
finally, it does not contest that exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable and comports with 
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, le., that it would not be unfair or 
unduly burdensome for Closing Resources to litigate this case in Utah. 
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Instead, as set forth below, Closing Resources falls back to defend indefensible 
terrain—that it could not reasonably anticipate being haled into Utah. And it does so 
based only on broad, self-serving statements and generalized arguments, invention of 
new terms that attempt to limit the impact of its correspondence, and facts that have more 
to do with an assertion of general jurisdiction than the issue at hand—specific 
jurisdiction. 
II. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDME NT DOES NOT PROVIDE AN OUT-OF-
STATE ESCROW AGENT AN AUTOMATIC EXEMPTION FROM 
BEING HALED INTO COURT IN UTAH. 
A. Walker v. Conquest Energy, Inc. is Irrelevant and Inapposite. 
Closing Resources5 principal argument is a general statement that "[m]erely 
providing escrow services is not a sufficient basis for the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction." [Appellee Br. at 5.] In support of this statement Closing Resources relies 
on a single case, Walker v. Conquest Energy, Inc., No. 2:06CV872 DAK, 2007 WL 
2220554 (D. Utah July 30, 2007).1 But there are several problems with reliance on 
Walker. First, Walker does not stand for a general proposition of law. Ralher, in Walker 
the court found determinative the fact that "there is no suggestion that [the escrow agent] 
has ever sent mail or facsimiles to [the plaintiff] or that he communicated with him in any 
way." Id at *3. Indeed, the record in Walker was completely devoid of any purposeful 
communication by the escrow agent to the plaintiff in Utah. See id. at ** 1-3. That is in 
stark contrast to this case, in which Closing Resources purposefully sent both mail and 
1
 For the convenience of the Court, a copy of Walker is attached as Addendum A. 
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email communications to Fort Pierce in Utah, knowing full well that Fort Pierce was in 
Utah. 
Second, Walker concerned jurisdiction over an out-of-state escrow agent who was 
involved in a transaction between parties for the exchange of shares of stock in a 
corporation. It did not involve real property or any property expressly linked to Utah. 
Further, the court's short memorandum decision in Walker provides no indication of the 
residence of the corporate party involved in the transaction, and does not discuss the 
corporate party's connections to Utah. Again, that is in stark contrast to the facts of this 
case, which involves real property in Utah; a Utah based seller to whom the escrow agent 
owes fiduciary duties; and an agreement specifying Utah as the forum for the resolution 
of disputes. Thus, Closing Resources' reliance upon Walker and its assertion that it is no 
different than the escrow agent in Walker is misplaced. 
Moreover, Closing Resources concedes Fort Pierce's argument in the course of 
trying to attack it. Closing Resources argues that it "was perfectly capable of providing 
the escrow services without every [sic] setting foot in Utah or directing its activities 
toward Utah." [Appellee Br. at 5.] But in the next breath (at 5-6), it concedes that cc[a]ll 
Closing Resources had to do as escrow agent was deposit funds in its Maryland bank 
account, and convey those funds from Maryland to either Fort Pierce in Utah or ST Paper 
in Maryland or Wisconsin." (Emphasis added.) While we disagree with Closing 
Resources' narrow view of its obligations in this transaction, by making this statement 
Closing Resources concedes that it agreed to and is obligated to direct its conduct to 
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Utah. Thus, Closing Resources could reasonably anticipate being haled into court in 
Utah. 
Finally, Walker is not binding precedent. See People v. Whaley, 152 Cal. App. 
4th 968, 984 (Cal. App. 2007) (stating state courts "are not bound by decisions of the 
lower federal courts, even on federal questions." (quotation and citation omitted); State v. 
Mechtel 499 N.W.2d 662, 666 (Wis. 1993) (stating "the United States Supreme Court's 
determinations on federal questions bind state courts. It is clear, however, that 
determinations on federal questions by either the federal circuit courts of appeal or the 
federal district courts are not binding upon state courts"). It is a short, unpublished 
memorandum decision that has no application on its facts to this case. Perfunctory 
adoption of the thin analysis in Walker would serve only to make the Fourteenth 
Amendment an automatic exemption to out-of-state escrow agents, immunizing them 
from being haled into court in Utah—regardless of the facts. 
B. Inventing Names for Correspondence Does not Allow Closing 
Resources to Escape Utah's Jurisdiction. 
Closing Resources' next argument to evade jurisdiction is to assert that its contacts 
with Utah in this "one transaction" are insufficient to assert jurisdiction over it. But 
again, it concedes the very point it is arguing. [Appellee's Br. at 6-7.] It argues that 
"[bjeyond its services as escrow agent for this one transaction, Closing Resources has no 
other contacts with Utah." But Closing Resources does not seek to establish general 
jurisdiction over Closing Resources. Thus, this "one transaction" is the only transaction 
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that matters in determining jurisdiction in this case. And this lawsuit involves the "one 
transaction" that Closing Resources concedes is related to its contacts with Utah. 
Perhaps recognizing this, Closing Resources invents labels for its correspondence 
and then seeks shelter behind those labels. It asserts that it should not be haled into court 
in Utah because its "emails were merely administrative in nature." [Appellee Br. at 6.] 
Then it tries to characterize the content of its letters to Fort Pierce as being "sent in the 
context of potential litigation between ST Paper and Fort Pierce, rather than in connection 
with Closing Resources' provision of escrow services for the contemplated transaction." 
[Id.] Those are exceedingly fine hairs to split. 
Labeling a communication as "administrative," or applying any other arbitrary 
label, does not change the fact that Closing Resources knowingly directed 
communication to Fort Pierce in Utah concerning the transaction at issue in this litigation. 
Further, Closing Resources' description of the letters is inaccurate. The letters sent to 
Fort Pierce in Utah were not merely sent in the context of potential litigation between two 
principals. Those letters were directly related to Closing Resources' escrow services and, 
in fact, contained threats to Fort Pierce that Closing Resources would release the deposit 
to ST Paper. As pointed out in our opening brief, the emails and communications 
Closing Resources directed to Utah were precisely the quality and nature of 
communications one would expect from an escrow agent. [Appellant's Br. at 20-22.] 
Thus, there is no jurisdictional safe harbor to be found in one's ability to creatively label 
and spin its communications. 
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Moreover, Closing Resources' reliance on Fenn v. Mleads Enterprises, Inc., 2006 
UT 8, 137 P.3d 706, is also misplaced. Closing Resources claims Fenn stands for the 
broad proposition that simply sending an email is not enough to invoke jurisdiction over a 
party. But the issue in Fenn was not that broad. In Fenn, the Utah Supreme Court 
addressed a narrow issue: "whether due process permits a Utah court to exert personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant who sends an email without knowledge of the residence of 
the recipient or the location at which the recipient will retrieve the message." Id at ^[1. 
That is not the issue that confronts this Court. It is beyond dispute that Closing 
Resources sent its emails with knowledge of Fort Pierce's residence and location. This is 
simply not a case of a "spammer" sending random email over the Internet that 
inadvertently and unknowingly lands in Utah. And, this is simply not a case of a single 
email. Rather, Closing Resources sent several emails to Fort Pierce and several letters 
through the U.S. mail to Fort Pierce. And it knew that it was sending them to Fort 
Pierce's Utah address. 
In sum, exercise of specific jurisdiction over Closing Resources is proper, and the 
trial court erred in holding otherwise. 
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III. CLOSING RESOURCES' REFUSAL TO RELEASE THE DEPOSIT TO 
FORT PIERCE IS INJURY TO FORT PIERCE. 
Closing Resources' final argument is that Fort Pierce does not allege that Closing 
Resources has injured Fort Pierce. It is not clear whether this argument is an attack on 
the complaint, or whether Closing Resources is actually arguing the merits of the case. 
What is clear is that, in either case, this argument does not implicate jurisdiction, and it 
does not alter the jurisdictional analysis. 
As Fort Pierce alleged in its complaint and set forth in detail in our opening brief, 
Closing Resources is holding and refusing to release a deposit that belongs to Fort Pierce. 
[R. 1-9.] Fort Pierce has requested an order and judgment requiring Closing Resources to 
release the deposit to Fort Pierce. [R. 1-9.] Closing Resources' failure to release the 
deposit to Fort Pierce, pursuant to its instructions and the escrow agreement, and Closing 
Resources' threat to unilaterally release the deposit to ST Paper, contrary to Fort Pierce's 
instruction, all cause injury to Fort Pierce. 
Indeed, under Utah's "liberal standard of notice pleading," all Fort Pierce was 
required only to "submit a c short and plain statement. . . showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief and 'a demand for judgment for the relief" Canfield v. Layton City, 
2005 UT 60, T114, 122 P.3d 622 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a)(l)-(2)). "The plaintiff must 
only give the defendant 'fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a 
general indication of the type of litigation involved.'" Id. (quoting Williams v. State 
Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982) (internal quotation omitted)). This is 
exactly what Fort Pierce has done in this case. 
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Ignoring the lack of application to the issue before the Court, Closing Resources 
then goes on to argue that it has "done nothing wrong." [Appellee Br. at 7.] It does not 
matter that Closing Resources thinks it has done nothing wrong. That is not a standard to 
determine jurisdiction. Fort Pierce alleges, asserts, and has shown that Closing 
Resources is holding and refusing to release funds that belong to Fort Pierce. Closing 
Resources is holding these funds contrary to Fort Pierce's written instructions. And, in 
fact, Closing Resources is threatening to unilaterally release the funds to another party. 
As set forth in our opening brief, this Court must view all facts alleged in Ihe complaint, 
all factual disputes, and all inferences in favor of Fort Pierce. See Pohl, Inc. of Am. v. 
Webelhuth, 2008 UT 89, ^|8, 201 P.3d 944. Eiased on this standard, specific jurisdiction 
is appropriate. And ultimately, if Closing Resources has done nothing wrong, it can 
come to Utah and show it. 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, as set forth above and in our opening brief, this Court should reverse 
the trial court and instruct it that it has specific jurisdiction over Closing Resources in this 
matter. 
DATED THIS 2 ^ day of July 2009. 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR, P.C. 
BRYAN\JJPATTISON 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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Tab A 
Slip Copy, 2007 WL 2220554 (D.Utah) 
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. 
United States District Court, 
D. Utah, 
Central Division. 
Jock WALKER, Plaintiff, 
v. 
CONQUEST ENERGY, INC., Philip G. Hayden, and David T. Hooper, Defendants. 
No. 2:06CV872 DAK. 
July 30, 2007. 
J. Grant Walker. Jackson White PC, Mesa, AZ, Lee Anne Walker. Salt Lake City, UT, for 
Plaintiff. 
Bret B. Hicken. Spanish Fork, UT, for Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
DALE A. KIMBALL, United States District Judge. 
*1 This matter is before the court on Defendant David T. Hooper's ("Mr.Hooper") 
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. A hearing on the motion was held on 
July 2, 2007. At the hearing, Mr. Hooper appeared by telephone and represented 
himself. Plaintiff Jock Walker ("Mr.Walker") was represented by J. Grant Walker. Before 
the hearing, the court considered carefully the memoranda and other materials 
submitted by the parties. Since taking the motion under advisement, the court has 
further considered the law and facts relating to the motion. Now being fully advised, the 
court renders the following Memorandum Decision & Order. 
In his Complaint, Mr. Walker claims that Defendants Conquest Energy ("Conquest") 
and Phillip Hayden ("Mr.Hayden"), the President of Conquest, contacted him through the 
mail at his home in Orem, Utah, and solicited and made a securities offering to him on 
October 3, 2000. Pursuant to the offer made to him, Mr. Walker entered into a 
Repurchase Agreement in which Mr. Walker agreed to transfer all of his rights in the oil 
and gas wells acquired from Conquest on or before December 31, 1997 in return for 
1,176 shares of Gastar Explorations, Ltd. 
According to Mr. Walker's allegations, as part of this transaction, Mr. Hooper, who 
resides in Tennessee, agreed to act as Escrow Agent and to deliver the 1,176 shares of 
Gastar to Mr. Walker. Mr. Walker claims that despite repeated promises, and in breach 
of the Repurchase Agreement, the Defendants did not ever deliver to Mr. Walker the 
promised 1,176 shares of Gastar Exploration stock. Mr. Walker claims that his interests 
in the oil and gas wells and his shares of stock were converted by Defendants for their 
own use. 
Mr. Hooper has moved to dismiss, claiming that this court cannot exercise personal 
jurisdiction over him. Mr. Hooper correctly points out that the Complaint is silent as to 
any involvement by Mr. Hooper in the solicitation and offering to Mr. Walker and that the 
Complaint fails to allege any contact by Mr. Hooper with Mr. Walker in this transaction-or 
any other transaction-and that it fails to allege any contact by Mr. Hooper with the State 
of Utah. 
In addition, Mr. Hooper has filed an affidavit, asserting that he has never been to 
Utah, except for once when he was a child. He has had no business or any other 
relationship with Mr. Walker, he has never solicited any contact with any individual or 
entity in Utah, he is not registered to do business in Utah, and he has never contacted 
Mr. Walker by telephone, mail, etc. 
Mr. Walker, on the other hand, argues that this court does have jurisdiction because 
Mr. Hooper served as an escrow agent and as counsel for the issuer/offeror in this 
transaction. Also, in his opposition memorandum, Mr. Walker asserts that he "believes" 
that Mr. Hooper drafted some or all of the solicitation and contractual documentation. Mr. 
Walker also claims that Mr. Hooper has held the securities to be exchanged and was at 
least privy to the failure to transfer to Mr. Walker the assets Mr. Walker paid for. 
DISCUSSION 
*2 When, as in this case, a district court considers a motion to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction without conducting an evidentiary hearing, "the plaintiff need only 
make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction to defeat the motion."" OMI 
Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Canada, 149 F.3d 1086, 1091 (10th Cir.1998). The 
court, however, finds that Mr. Walker has not made a prima facie showing of personal 
jurisdiction. 
There is no contention that general jurisdiction exists, and therefore the relevant 
question is whether specific jurisdiction exists. "[T]he evaluation of specific jurisdiction in 
Utah mandates a three-part inquiry: '(1) the defendant's acts or contacts must implicate 
Utah under the Utah long-arm statute; (2) a 'nexus1 must exist between the plaintiffs 
claims and the defendant's acts or contacts; and (3) application of the Utah long-arm 
statute must satisfy the requirements of federal due process/ " National Petroleum 
Mkt'g, Inc. v. Phoenix Fuel Co., 902 F.Supp. 1459, 1465 (D.Utah 1995) (quoting 
Harnischfeger Eng'rs, Inc., 883 F.Supp. at 612-13); see also Far West Capital, Inc., 46 
F.3d at 1074. The legislature has declared that the long-arm statute must be interpreted 
broadly "so as to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the fullest extent 
permitted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution." § 78-27-22; see also Starways, Inc. v. Curry, 980 P.2d 204, 206 (Utah 
1999) ("We have held that the Utah long-arm statute 'must be extended to the fullest 
extent allowed by due process of law.1") (quoting Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching 
Co., 701 P.2d 1106, 1110 (Utah 1985)). The Utah Supreme Court has stated that it 
"frequently make[s] a due process analysis first because any set of circumstances that 
satisfies due process will also satisfy the long-arm statute." Sll MegaDiamond, Inc. y. 
American Superabrasives Corp., 969 P.2d 430, 433 (Utah 1998); see also Far West 
Capital, Inc., 46 F.3d at 1075 (proceeding directly to constitutional analysis). 
Accordingly, the court will proceed to determine whether the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over Mr. Hooper meets federal due process standards. 
"The Due Process Clause protects an individual's liberty interest in not being subject 
to the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful 
'contacts, ties, or relations/ " Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72 
(1985) (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)); see 
also OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Canada, 149 F.3d 1086, 1090 (10th 
Cir.1998). Accordingly, a "court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident 
defendant only so long as there exist 'minimum contacts1 between the defendant and the 
forum state." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980) 
(quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316). 
*3The "minimum contacts" necessary for specific personal jurisdiction are 
established " 'if the defendant has "purposefully directed" his activities at residents of the 
forum and the litigation results from alleged injuries that "arise out of or relate to" those 
activities.'" OMI Holdings, Inc., 149 F.3d at 1091 (quoting Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. 
at 472) (other quotations omitted). If the defendant's activities create sufficient minimum 
contacts, the court then considers "whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant offends 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice/ " Id. (quoting 
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987)). 
The court therefore examines the quantity and quality of Mr. Hooper's contacts with 
Utah, including "prior negotiations and contemplated future consequences, along with 
the terms of the contract and the parties' actual course of dealing," Burger King Corp., 
471 U.S. at 479, to determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Mr. 
Hooper comports with due process. 
The only allegation is that Mr. Hooper agreed to serve as an escrow agent and-
although not pleaded in the Complaint-that he may have acted as counsel to Convergys 
and Mr. Hayden. The court finds that those actions are insufficient to satisfy due 
process. 
There is no suggestion that Mr. Hooper solicited Mr. Walker's business. "[Solicitation 
is some evidence suggesting purposeful availment." Far West Capital, Inc., 46 F.3d at 
1076 (citing Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 473. Additionally, there is no suggestion that 
Mr. Hooper has ever sent mail or facsimiles to Mr. Walker or that he communicated with 
him in any way. Thus, the court concludes that there are insufficient contacts with Utah. 
There is no indication that Mr. Hooper "purposefully directed" his activities at a resident 
of Utah. In addition, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Mr. Hooper would offend 
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Asahi Metal Industry Co., 480 
U.S. at 113. 
Accordingly, Defendant David T. Hooper's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal 
Jurisdiction [docket # 11] is GRANTED, and he is DISMISSED from this action. 
D.Utah,2007. 
Walker v. Conquest Energy, Inc. 
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